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SCARING THE STATES INTO SUBMISSION? DI-
VERGENT APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and states that have passed
legislation protecting environmental audit results are engaged in a battle that has,
until recently, been primarily political. However, the battle has moved into the
legislative and adjudicative arenas, and it appears that Congress or the courts will
determine the final outcome of this conflict since the opponents, the EPA and the
states, cannot settle their ideological differences.
This comment provides a historical overview of the partnership between the
EPA and the states under various federal environmental legislative provisions. It
describes the EPA's current policy on environmental audit results, as well as
discusses the general content of most state audit immunity and privilege statutes. The
comment explains the choices available to the EPA when it is dissatisfied with a
state's actions and explains why those options are impractical. The comment
concludes with a description of the potential limitations placed on the EPA's attempts
to use environmental audit results in future dealings with the various entities as a
result of a recent Eighth Circuit appellate decision in a case of first impression.
II. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
Under provisions of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA),1 the
Clean Air Act (CAA),2 and the Clean Water Act (CWA),3 the EPA can delegate
authority to a state to issue various permits. The state then becomes responsible for
implementing environmental programs and enforcing certain EPA requirements.4
Two-thirds of all environmental enforcement actions taken in the United States occur
under the provisions of these three programs.5 The RCRA establishes a program
dealing with practices related to the generation and disposal of hazardous wastes.6
The CAA establishes a program to research, regulate, and prevent air pollution on a
national level.7 The CWA establishes a program for protecting surface waters in the
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1994 & Supp. 1996)
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994 & Supp. 1996)
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
4. 4See Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1994); Clean Air Act
(CAA) § 502(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d) (1994); Clean Water Act (CWA) § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994).
5. See RESOURCES, CoMMUNrY, AND ECON. DEV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENViRONMENTAL
PROTECION: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS TO FOCUS STATE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS ON RESULTS 19 (1998)
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS].
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1994).
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United States.8 Each state that wants to administer a program established under any
of these three acts enacts legislation that meets minimum standards established by the
acts.9 The EPA then determines whether the minimum standards set by the EPA were
met by the state's statutory program and if so, approves the state's program.' Once
approval is received from the EPA, the state may then issue permits under the
appropriate program."'
Once approved, state laws are applied to administer the state's program;
however, the EPA retains the authority to enforce permits issued under the state's
programs and may initiate administrative, civil, or criminal actions against
violators.12 The result of the permitting programs is concurrent jurisdiction, which
can result in conflicts where the boundaries between state and federal enforcement
agencies are not clearly defined.13
If the EPA is dissatisfied with a state's program or with a state's enforcement
efforts and wants to take action, it has two options available. First, the EPA can
revoke permit-granting authority from the state if it deems the state is not meeting
specified standards.14 Second, the EPA can intervene in a state action, a practice
called overfiling."5 Both options are extreme measures and do not allow for a
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994).
8. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
9. RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1994) ("Any State which seeks to administer and enforce a hazardous
waste program... may develop and... submit to the Administrator an application... for authorization of such
program.... Such State is authorized to carry out such program ... unless ... the Administrator notifies such State that
such program may not be authorized... and finds that (1) such State program is not equivalent to the Federal program
under this subtitle, (2) such program is not consistent with the Federal or State programs applicable in other States, or
(3) such program does not provide adequate enforcement of compliance with the requirements of this subtitle."); CAA
§ 502(d),42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d) (1994) ("[Elach State shall develop and submit to the Administrator a permit program
under State or local law.. meeting the requirements of this title.... The Administrator may approve a program to the
extent that theprogram meets therequirements of this Act."); 42 U.S.C. §7414(b) ("Each State may develop and submit
to theAdministrator a procedure forcarrying out his section in such State. If the Administrator finds the State procedure
is adequate, he may delegate to such State any authority he has to carry out this section."); CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b) (1994) ("[Elach State desiring to administer its own permit program .. may submit to the Administrator
a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and administer under State law .... The
Administrator shall approve each such submittedprogram unless hedetermines that adequate authority does not exist.").
10. See RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1994); CAA § 502(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d) (1994); CWA §
402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994).
11. SeeRCRA§3006(b)
12. See CAA § 502(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(e) (1994) (stating "[n]othing in this subsection should be construed to
limit the Administrator's ability to enforce permits issued by a State"); CWA § 402), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(W) (1994)
(stating "[n]othing in this section... shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to take action
pursuant to section 309 of this Act"). There are criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement options available to the
federal government under RCRA § 3008, U.S.C. § 6928 (1994), CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1994), and CWA
§ 309,33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994).
13. See StevenD. Cook, Comment, StatelFederal Enforcement ofthe Clean AirAct and Other Federal Pollution
Laws: Federal Overfiling on State Enforcement Proceedings, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (1987).
14. See RCRA § 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1994) ("Whenever the Administrator determines.., that a State
is not administering and enforcing a program... in accordance with requirements of this section, he shall so notify the
State and, if appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reasonable time ... the Administrator shall withdraw
authorization of such program."); CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1994) ("Whenever the Administrator
determines ... that a State is not administering a program... in accordance with requirements of this section, he shall
so notify the State and... shall withdraw approval of such program.").
15. See RCRA § 3008,42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1994) (authorizing EPA enforcement action); CAA § 113,42 U.S.C.
§ 7413 (1994) (authorizing EPA enforcement action); CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994) (authorizing EPA
enforcement action). These provisions, together with CWA § 402(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342W) (1994) ("Nothing in this
2
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manageable, reliable system where the EPA, the states, and entities required to
comply with the regulations know what to expect.
II1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EPA AND THE STATES
The EPA's primary goal is to deter entities from committing environmental
violations. The EPA's position is that minimum standards are required to provide for
consistent environmental enforcement.' 6 This position is reasonable; however, the
EPA appears to take a "bean counting" approach to enforcement efforts, evaluating
the success of state programs based on the "number of inspections conducted and the
number of enforcement actions taken against violators."' 7 This approach ostensibly
encourages the EPA's deterrence goal, and "[u]nder this deterrence approach, it is
assumed that the more inspections are conducted and enforcement actions taken, the
greater the deterrent effect and the higher level of compliance."' 8 The EPA has stated
that it will maintain an "imposing enforcement presence" currently and in the future
by "continuing to take vigorous, timely, and quality enforcement actions."' 9
Enforcement actions may consist of "civil and criminal prosecution in courts,
administrative orders, and other forms of action that take place after a violation has
occurred."'2 The emphasis on enforcement and compliance has been criticized
because these activities do not necessarily determine whether environmental goals are
being met. 21 Although the EPA insists that consistency is mandatory, the EPA has
been attacked for inconsistencies in its approach within its various regions.22 The
states indicate that they have received "mixed messages" from the EPA headquarters
section [providing for NPDES permit programs] shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to take
action pursuant to section 1319 of this title.") and CAA § 502(e), 42 U.S.C. §7661a(e) (1994) ("Nothing in this
subsection [providing for state permit programs] should be construed to limit the Administrator's ability to enforce
permits issued by a State.") appear to grant full enforcement authority to the states while retaining concurrent
enforcement authority by the EPA. But cf RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1994) ("Such State is authorized
to carry out such program in lieu of the Federal program.") (emphasis added); and RCRA § 3006(d), 42 U.S.C. §
6926(d) (1994) ("Any action taken by a State under a hazardous waste program authorized under this section shall
have the sameforce and effect as action taken by the Administrator.") (emphasis added). The language in the RCRA
appears to signify that a state program, once approved, replaces the federal program rather than supplementing it.
16. See State-EPA Partnership Could Improve Consistency of Superfund Enforcement, HAzARDOUS WASTE
NEwS, June 16,1997, available in 1997 WL 10931370. See also Environmental SelfAudits: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversightand Investigations ofthe House Commerce Comm., 105thCong. (1998) (statementofSteven
A. Herman, Associate Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA).
17. ENviRONMENTAL PROTECrlON: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 17.
18. Theodore L. Garrett, Reinventing EPA Enforcement, 12 NAT. RESOURCEs &ENV'T 180,180 (Winter 1998).
19. Steven A. Herman, EPA 's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Prioritiesfor Fiscal Year 1995, 10 No.
1 NAAGNAT'LENvTL ENFORCE~mNTJ. 3,3 (Feb. 1995).
20. EPA Guide to Environmental Issues (visited Aug. 10, 1998)http://iridium.nttc.edu/env/general/guide.hmb>.
21. States Report Progress on Relationship with Federal Government on Enforcement, BNANAT'LENV'TDAILY,
June 12, 1997, at d18.
22. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 4. The report also states that
state officials have commented that "a fragmented and inconsistent approach among different EPA offices on the
appropriateuse ofalternative compliance strategies has made it difficult to devise a coherent, results-oriented approach
acceptable to all key EPA stakeholders." Id. at 7.
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and the EPA regional offices. 23  States claim that EPA's focus on quantitative
enforcement outputs is in itself inconsistent with other EPA programs which focus
on results. 4
The states consider themselves "laboratories" that can perform experiments to
determine the best method of handling environmental compliance and improvements.2
The states want to develop their own methods in response to their own needs. States
actually initiate most of the enforcement actions in the United States,26 and the states
believe they do a better job of handling enforcement.27 For example, Oklahoma
Senator Jim Inhofe compared the remediation of two Oklahoma superfund sites, one
administered by the state and the other by the federal government.28 In Senator
Inhofe's comparison, the federal government took eleven years to remediate its site,
while Oklahoma took three years to remediate its site at one-third the cost of the
federal site remediation.29
States indicate that self-audit laws provide incentive for companies to discover,
resolve, andremediate environmental problems that would otherwise go undetected."
Many states consider entity involvement crucial to improving the environment despite
the fact that only two percent of regulated entities are on regulatory agency inspection
schedules.3 Even with the combined efforts of the EPA and the states, the risk or
possibility an entity will be of inspected is marginal.32 Statistics support the view of
some who argue "ignorance is rewarded while good faith compliance efforts create
risks of punishment., 3 States believe the audit laws' focus on "positive encourage-
23. Id. at56. See also EPA OFFICEOFINSPECTOR GENERAL, CONSOLIDATED REVIEWOFAIRENFORCEMENTAND
COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, REPORT 7100306 (Sept. 30, 1997) (visited Aug. 10, 1998)
<http:lwww.epa.gov/oigearth1997sectl.htm>, in which an OIG audit indicated inconsistent enforcement among three
EPA regions. Over an 18 month period, Region 5 completed 33 enforcement actions and assessed more than $6 million
in penalties. Region 9 completed 25 actions and assessed approximately $3.5 million in penalties. Region 6 completed
2 actions and assessed just over $100,000 in penalties. Id.
24. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 8. Also, the General
Accounting Office indicates that the EPA is encouraging the use of performance measures through its National
Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS). See id. at 46.
25. SeeEnvironmentalSefAudits:HearingsBeforetheSubcomm. on Oversightandnvestigations oftheHouse
Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Gale Norton, Attorney General, State ofColomdo)[hereinafter
Norton Statement].
26. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 16. In 1996 states took
9,306 administrative enforcement actions - 85% ofall such actions taken that year. Id.
27. See States Report Progress on Relationship with Federal Government on Enforcement, supra note 21.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Norton Statement, supra note 25.
31. See Liability from Voluntary Environmental Audits: Hearings Before the Senate Environment and Public
Works Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Michael B. Enzi, Senator, State of Wyoming) [hereinafter Enzi
Statement].
32. See RESOURCES, CoMMuNrrY AND ECON. DEv. Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL
AUDING: A USEFUL TOOL THAT CAN IMPROVE PERFORMANCE AND REDUCE COSTS 5 (1995). See also State
EnvironmentalAudit Laws Advance Goal ofa CleanerEnvironment, James M. Weaver, RobertJ. Martinau, Jr., &
Michael K. Stagg, 11 NAT. RESOURCES &ENV'T6, 12 (Spring 1997) (citingTEXAsSENATENAT.RESOuRCES COMM.,
INTERIM REPORT TO THE 75TH LEGISLATURE: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL AUDrI LEGISLATION (1996)
"Texas has only 635 full-time enforcement employees and more than 200,000 regulated entities,") Id.
33. S. 582 and Voluntary EnvironmentalAudits: Hearings on S. 582 Before the Subcomm. onAdmin. Oversight
and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Patricia S. Bangert, Senior
Deputy Solicitor General, State of Colorado).
4
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ment rather than penalties"34 establishes the kind of innovative environmental policies
that augment the limited resources available to both state and federal government
agencies.35 Because resources are so limited, the states believe that environmental
audits provide a way to "identify and correct environmental problems"3 6 before they
are discovered by inspectors.37 States have indicated the legislative processes
involved in enacting self-audit laws have made people more aware of an "objective
... to have a cleaner, safer environment--not to levy big fines."3
The often adversarial relationship between states and the EPA was character-
ized as one for which the "EPA's perspective appears to be that they own the ranch
and that we, the states, are the hired ranch hands."39 "What seems to be missing is
EPA's willingness to make a commitment in response to a commitment by industry
to conduct audits. In short, EPA appears not to accept the proposition that self-
evaluations are an essential tool to ensure compliance, and not a device to protect
non-compliance."''4 The Clinton Administration recognized that "the adversarial
approach that has often characterized our environmental system precludes opportuni-
ties for creative solutions that a more collaborative system might encourage.",
41
Despite increasing criticism, the EPA continues to emphasize strong enforce-
ment as the means for deterring entities from committing environmental violations.4'
The EPA appears proud of the "record level of civil and criminal fines and penalties,
as well as record levels of civil and criminal referrals to the Department of Justice, ' 3
which "sent a strong deterrent message to the regulated community"' in 1994.' The
EPA is concerned with reduced enforcement because in 1996, states took seventeen
percent fewer enforcement actions than were taken by the states in 1994.' A drop
in enforcement actions, however, does not necessarily indicate fewer inspections;
fewer actions could indicate that there are truly fewer violations and thus greater
compliance.47 Greater compliance is more likely the cause of fewer enforcement
actions because inspections are focused on larger entities, who are now generally
34. Norton Statement, supra note 25.
35. See id.
36. ENVmONMENTAL PROTECON: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 25.
37. See id.
38. Enzi Statement, supra, note 31.
39. Enforcement of Environment and Public Works: Oversight Hearing on the Relationship Between the Fed.
and State Gov'ts in the Enforcement of Environmental Laws Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Patricia S. Bangert, Director of Legal Policy, Attorney General's Office, State
of Colorado) [hereinafter Bangert Statement Ill.
40. Lynn L. Bergeson, EPA's Plan: Covering the Bases or Covering Its Tracks? Vague Promises of
Reassessment Make Business Nervous, CORP. LEGAL TmiES, Sept. 1994, at 20.
41. Ben Lieberman, Environmental Audits: Colorado Carrots Versus Federal Sticks in Environmental
Enforcement, Independence Institute Independence Issue Paper, Number 1-98 (visited Aug. 10, 1998)
<http:/lwww.i2i.orglSuptDoeslEnvirolAudits.htm>.
42. See ENVIRONiENTAL PROTECInON: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 4,17,47.
43. Herman, supra note 19, at 3.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTjON: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 31.
47. See id. at 33. See also Garrett, supra note 18, at 180 (stating that "[alt a time when corporations are reducing
emissions and improving compliance, the government is somewhat perversely driven to bring an increasing number of
lawsuits and to collect higher fines to justify their budgets and prove that they are performing.").
1999]
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aware of environmental compliance requirements and have taken necessary actions
to comply.
IV. ENViRONMENTAL AuDITs
A "'voluntary self-evaluation' is a self-initiated assessment, audit or review, not
otherwise expressly required by law, performed for a company or person to determine
whether the entity or individual is in compliance with environmental laws." '48 Audits
are conducted by teams comprised of qualified employees or contractors. 49 These
teams evaluate an organization's compliance with environmental regulations using
tools such as checklists, audit standards, and their own professional judgment5 The
teams may also evaluate the effectiveness of an organization's efforts and systems
used to monitor compliance.51
Environmental audits provide a myriad of benefits apart from the obvious
motives to establish compliance and avoid civil penalties and criminal liability. By
implementing environmental audits, a company may become less subject to
assessments and improve its status as a good corporate citizen.52 Environmental
audits can lower remediation and cleanup costs, correct problems, and reduce
environmental, health, and safety hazards (thereby improving safety accident records)
as well as ensure compliance. 53 Self-audits permit state and federal entities to use
their resources elsewhere, and prevent pollution from taking place by detecting
problems instead of merely fixing them after violations have occurred.54 Self-audits
may uncover more problems and thus lead to improved environmental conditions
because inspections made by an entity of its own operations will generally be more
thorough than inspections made by state or federal regulatory agencies due to the
more detailed knowledge operators have of their own facilities." Reliance on
companies that perform self-audits actually releases scarce resources that can be used
elsewhere, thus increasing environmental compliance coverage. 56
Despite the benefits of self-audits, many entities are not expanding their current
environmental audit programs. A recent survey indicates that seventy-five percent
of industrial companies have instituted some type of environmental program.5
Almost half the companies with programs indicated they would be willing to expand
48. Liability from Voluntary Environmental Audits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Patricia S. Bangert, Director of Legal Policy, Attorney General's
Office, State of Colorado) [hereinafter Bangert Statement Iff].
49. See RESOURCES, COMMUNrrY AND ECON. DEV. Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONIENTAL
AUDnING: A USEFUL TOOL THAT CAN IMPROVE PERFORMANCE AND REDUCE COSTS 2 (1995).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 18.
53. See id. at 2.
54. See John F. Cooney &Judson W. Starr, Criminal Enforcement in a Decentralized Environment (visited Aug.
10, 1998) <http://www.venable.con/govern/crimenfc.htm>.
55. See Weaver, et al., supra note 32, at 11.
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their programs if they did not feel threatened by the possible use of audit information
in either lawsuits or enforcement actions.58 Ten percent of those with self-audit
programs indicated the government used audit report information against them, while
twenty-five percent indicated that third parties tried to obtain the companies' audit
information.59
Companies appear adequately justified in their concern that audit results may
be used against them. A 1995 Price Waterhouse report surveyed 258 companies and
noted that twenty-three of them "indicated that their audit findings had been
involuntarily disclosed to federal or state agencies," while thirty-one companies
"reported that such agencies had used voluntarily disclosed results against them in
enforcement actions. 60
V. STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AuDrr LAWS
In recent years, various states have begun to develop alternative ways to
promote compliance with environmental laws and regulations. The major develop-
ment has been the enactment of environmental statutes which provide privileges or
immunity, rewarding voluntarily performed environmental audits. 61 Currently
twenty-five states have enacted these type statutes.62 Many state legislatures have
unanimously approved the audit laws.63
The states adopting environmental audit legislation indicate that the audit
protection furthers the goal of improving the environment by encouraging entities to
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Timothy A. Wilkins & Cynthia A.M. Stroman, Delegation Blackmail: EPA's Misguided War on State Audit
Privilege Laws, Washington Legal Foundation Critical Legal Issues, Working Paper Series No. 69, August 1996
(visited Aug. 10, 1998) <http://www.bracepattcom> (citing Elimination of Penalties Could Boost Environmental
Self-Auditing, Survey Says, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA), Apr. 7, 1995, at A-i).
61. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 24-5.
62. States with privilege and immunity legislation: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.450 - .25.490 (Michie Supp.
1997); Colorado, COLO.REV.STAT.ANN. §§ 13-25-126.5,13-90-107(j),25-1-114.5 (West 1998); Idaho, IDAHOCODE
§§ 9-801 to -811 (Supp. 1997) (expired 12/31/97); Iowa, 1997 Ia. H.F. 681 (to be codified at IoWA CODE ANN. §
455J.1-J.13); Kansas, KAN.STAT.ANN. §§ 60-3332to-3339 (Supp. 1997); Kentucky, KY.REv.STAT.ANN. § 224.01-
040 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996); Michigan, MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 324.14801 to .14810 (Supp. 1998); Minnesota,
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 114C.20-C.31 (West 1997); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-1201 to -1206 (1997);
Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 445C.010 - C.120 (1997); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-E:1 to -E:9
(Supp. 1997); Ohio, Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.70 -.73; South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-57-10 to -110
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); Texas, TEX. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477cc (West Supp. 1998); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.1-1198 to -1199 (Michie 1998); and Wyoming, WYo.STAT.ANN. §§ 35-11-1105 to -1106 (1997 & Supp.
1998). Six states hadenactedprivilegeonly legislation: Arkansas, ARK.CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-301 to-312 (MichieSupp.
1997); Illinois,415 IL. ComP.STAT. 5/52.2 (West Supp. 1997);Indiana, IND.CODEANN. §§ 13-10-13-1 to-12 (Vest
Supp. 1996) (repealed); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-51 (Supp. 1998); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963
(1997); Utah, UTAH CODEANN. §§ 19-7-101 to -109 (1995 & Supp. 1998). Three states had enacted immunity only
legislation: NewJersey, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-125 (WestSupp. 1998); RhodeIsland, R.I. GEN.LAWS §§ 42-17.8-1
to -8 (Supp. 1997); and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-40-33 to -37 (Supp. 1998). Two legislatures have
proposed privilege or immunity legislation: New Jersey, 1998 A.B. 136 (208th Leg., 1997-1998 Sess.) (proposed
privilege legislation in addition to current immunity legislation); and New York, 1997 S.B. 4870 & 1997 A.B. 1183
(221st Leg., 1997-1998 Sess.). Nineteen states have seen proposed legislation fail or die without action: Alabama,
Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
63. See Wilkins & Stroman, supra note 60.
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take action when, absent the audit statutes, they otherwise would not.64 The states'
position is that by encouraging compliance instead of strictly enforcing it, the states
discover and resolve violations and problems where they otherwise might not
encounter them, and stronger relations are established with the companies performing
self-audits.65 The states indicate that such privileges are necessary because
traditional legal protections, such as attorney-client privilege, the work product
doctrine, and the self-evaluative privilege, have practical limitations that inhibit the
usefulness of the audits should they be invoked.66 The attorney-client privilege
restricts environmental experts who are not lawyers from fully implementing
compliance efforts within their organizations, while the work product doctrine is
likely not applicable to routine audits.67 The self-evaluative privilege is restrictive
because it is not recognized in all jurisdictions. 68
The majority of audit privilege laws contain one or both of two major
provisions: privilege and immunity. 69  A privilege provision guarantees that
information discovered in an audit and the audit documents are inadmissible as
evidence in certain proceedings (generally administrative, civil, and criminal).70 An
immunity provision guarantees that companies are protected from penalties if they
correct violations they have voluntarily discovered through self-audits.7" Privilege
may be desirable in addition to immunity in order to protect a company's proprietary
processes" and other information that would otherwise not be disseminated to the
general public. Generally, neither the privilege nor the immunity provision is
unlimited; for example, a privilege will not protect information that is otherwise
required to be revealed under other regulations.7" Generally, the privilege and
immunity statutes have three common denominators: 1) an entity discovers
environmental violations in a self-conducted audit; 2) the entity "promptly and
voluntarily" reports the violations; and 3) the entity corrects the violations.74 Other
than the privilege and immunity provisions, the individual states' audit laws vary in
such areas as the definition of an audit and the determination of the conditions that
must be met in order for the privilege or immunity provisions to apply.
Most state laws do not grant privileges or immunities when companies discover
violations that are "environmentally serious, life-threatening, or deliberate."'
Privileges and immunities are only granted when violations are reported to the
64. See Bangert Statement III, supra note 48.
65. See id.
66. See Bergeson, supra note 40, at 20.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Alexander Volokh, Carrots OverSticks: The CaseforEnvironmentalSef-Audits, WA H.MoNrHLY, June





74. See ENViRONMBNTALPRoTECrION: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 26.
75. Lieberman, supra note 41.
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appropriate regulatory agencies and subsequently corrected. 6 Information that is
legally required is still available to any agency that has enforcement authority.7 7
Audit privilege and immunity statutes only provide limited access to audit results,
thus keeping audit reports from being "used as a roadmap for an easy enforcement
score.
' 78
Colorado's self-audit statutes grant limited immunity from civil, administrative,
and negligent criminal fines for disclosures of violations discovered in audits and
subsequently corrected. 79 The law does not allow companies to hide information.8"
Regulatory agencies can still obtain the information required to determine compliance
with environmental regulations, because the law allows a privilege only for
information that would not otherwise have to be disclosed."1 The law applies only if
violations are corrected." In certain instances, audit results can be disclosed.3 For
example, audit results can be disclosed if violations are not being corrected, or if
someone is trying to use the privilege for fraudulent purposes, or if the audit
information demonstrates "clear, present and impending danger to the public health
or environment. 81 4  Additionally, regulatory agencies can still issue compliance
orders, obtain injunctive relief, and criminally prosecute entities who are egregiously
violating environmental regulations.8
Colorado's self-audit statute86 was enacted partly in response to a self-audit
performed by Coors Brewing Company (Coors). After Coors spent eighteen months
and $1.5 million on a self-audit performed to investigate its volatile organic
compound emissions, the Colorado Department of Health (allegedly in response to
EPA pressure) imposed a civil penalty of $1.05 million against the company for state
air pollution violations. 7 Essentially, Coors was fined for violations that neither
Coors nor the health department knew about until the audit took place.88 Eventually,
the fine was reduced to a $100,000 fine and a $137,000 economic benefit payment,
but companies were put on guard that their audit results could be used against them.
89




79. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-114.5(1), (4) (West Supp. 1998). See also Bangert Statement Ill, supra
note 48.
80. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-126.5(4) (WestSupp. 1998). See also Bangert Statement I, supra note
48.
81. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-126.5(4) (West Supp. 1998).
82. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-114.5(1)(c) (West Supp. 1998). See also Bangert Statement IU, supra
note 48.
83. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-126.5(3)(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1998). See also Bangert Statement hI,
supra note 48.
84. Bangert Statement III, supra note 48. See also COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-126.5(3)(a)-(e) (West Supp.
1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-114.5(6) (West Supp. 1998).
85. See Bangert Statement II, supra note 48.
86. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-126.5, § 13-90-107(j), § 25-1-114.5.
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disclosures and requests for immunity have been made.9" The state's evaluation
demonstrates that immunity is not automatic, as five requests were denied.9
Colorado believes that more entities would come forward if the EPA were not
threatening to overfile or take administrative action against the companies using the
audit laws.92 In Texas, during the first year after its statute became effective, 256
companies gave notice of intent to audit.93 This figure may not be a firm estimate of
the total number of entities conducting audits, as these notices are only from
companies who may later seekimmunity frompenalties.94 Other companies that have
not given notice may seek only the privilege provision of the Texas law.9' Texas also
"received forty-two disclosures from regulated entities that had discovered viola-
tions. '9 6 These violations, and the information contained therein, were "public
information," 97 and Texas officials have claimed that the state would not have
discovered many of the violations through the state's own process.9"
Although the states express that their audit laws have had a positive impact, a
potential drawback to the enactment of state audit laws is the states' abilities to
measure results that would show increased compliance or, more importantly, an
improvement in the environment.99 Both states and the EPA agree that there must be
some method of evaluating the use of "alternative compliance strategies,"'" such as
environmental audits, in order to measure their success.' Problems inhibiting
measurement include lack of resources, lack of historical data to use for comparison
purposes, difficulty in quantifying outcomes, and difficulty in identifying links
between specific causes and effects."°
The states recognize the importance of measuring their programs' success, not
only to prove their position to the EPA, but also to provide accountability to the
general public and the media, who are also closely watching their efforts.'0 3 The
states also need to counter criticism that they may not be taking a hard enough
position against polluters."° In measuring their programs' effectiveness, the states
may have to focus more on measurement of outcomes and environmental indicators
rather than traditional outputs.105 Measurement of these outcomes and environmental
90. See Norton Statement, supra note 25.
91. See id.
92. See Bangert Statement III, supra note 48.
93. See Weaver, et al., supra note 32, at 12 (citing TEXAs SENATENAT. RsoURcEs CoMM., INTEW m REPORT TO






99. See ENVIRONmENTAL PROTECriON: EPA's AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 29.
100. Id. at 21.
101. See 1d.
102. See id. at 29.
103. See id. at 30.
104. See 1d. at6.
105. See ENvIRoNMENTALPRoTEcION: EPA's AND STATES' EFFORTs, supra note 5, at 32. Measuring outputs has
been used historically to evaluate effectiveness because it is relatively easy to count the number of inspections made and
enforcement actions taken. See id. Outcomes are characterized as results associated with a particular policy, and could
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indicators is inherently more difficult, but may be necessary to demonstrate that the
states' more lenient approach to compliance is as effective as the EPA's
inflexibility." 6 In a 1998 report, the General Accounting Office indicated that the
EPA needed to do more to "facilitate states' efforts to develop effective program
measures."'0 7 This may be done by incorporating parts of the EPA's own National
Performance Measures Strategy.10 The growing program, which focuses on
performance measures other than outputs, is currently applicable only to EPA
enforcement measures, but could eventually extend to state measures. 09
VI. THE EPA's PosrrIoN ON STATE SELF-AuDrr LAWS
The EPA strongly opposes the passage of laws protecting environmental audit
results."0 Historically, the EPA has discouraged states from passing such laws and
has indicated its opposition stems from several beliefs, including its ability to
effectively enforce environmental regulations and to access information concerning
potential environmental hazards."' The EPA also opposes audit privileges and
immunities because the EPA's methodology focuses on measuring success by totaling
the number of infractions and counting the dollars assessed as penalties." 2 The
states, as well as Congress, have attacked the EPA's position over the past few years,
and in 1996 the EPA issued a new policy on audits that was intended to provide
stronger support for protecting environmental results.13
The EPA's Audit Policy indicates that it fully supports the use of environmental
audits themselves; however, it continues to discourage the enactment of laws
protecting results.114 The policy states six specific reasons the EPA opposes such
laws: 1) the idea that privilege inherently encourages secrecy instead of openness; 2)
a lack of evidence to show that any privilege is necessary; 3) a tendency for entities
to identify all evidence as audit material, thus preventing the government's ability to
identify violations and assign responsibilities for them; 4) an increase in litigation as
a result of privilege; 5) the belief that the provisions in the policy negate any need for
privilege; and 6) an opposition to privilege in general by the law enforcement
be measured by the percentage of facilities in compliance with that particular policy. See id. Environmentalindicators
are associated with overall program goals, such as whether the environment has become cleaner. See id.




110. See EPA Convenes 'Summit' on 'E'Audits as Industry, States Ponder 'Privilege,' AIR WATER POLLuriON
REP., July 11, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2504456. See also Environmental Self Audits: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversightand Investigations ofthe House Commerce Comm., 105thCong. (1998) (statementofSteven
A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA).
111. See EnvironmentalSelfAudits: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on OversightandInvestigations ofthe House
Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA) [hereinafter Herman Statement I].
112. See Lieberman, supra note 41.
113. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg.
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community. 115
The two salient points to the EPA's 1996 Audit Policy are the elements
pertaining to audit report requests and penalty assessments."16 The policy indicated
the EPA would not routinely request or use audit results;" 7 however, it did not state
that the EPA would not use the audit results as evidence of violations."' The EPA
continues to claim that although it will request audit reports on a limited basis, it
needs to retain the ability to access the reports in order to maintain enforcement." 9
The EPA's position on audit reports has been called "wildly inconsistent,"' 2 ° for "[i]f
EPA has no intention of using audits in inspections or enforcement, one cannot
imagine how losing access to those audits would impair those inspection or
enforcement efforts." '' The audit policy does not prevent regulatory agencies or
other third parties from obtaining audit reports; therefore, sensitive and potentially
critical proprietary information of an entity performing an audit could be disclosed.
It is interesting that "[n]either the EPA nor the other opponents of state privileges can
cite a single concrete example of an enforcement or compliance matter frustrated by
the audit statutes.' 12
2
The EPA included new penalty-related provisions in its 1996 Audit Policy."
Based on nine conditions stated in the policy, the EPA will, at its discretion, reduce
or eliminate the gravity-based portion of civil penalties when violations discovered
during an audit are disclosed and corrected. 124 Meeting the conditions does not reduce
the economic benefit portion of the penalties. 125  Although the potential penalty
reduction appears to be a positive step, the nine conditions required for penalty
abatement have been called "highly convoluted and restrictive' 126 and may not offer
as much benefit as hoped for by entities conducting self-audits. 27
[The] EPA has consistently opposed this approach (of state audit privilege laws),
115. See id.
116. See id. at 66, 707-08.
117. See idat 66, 708.
118. SeeMi.




123. See Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 113, at 66,711.
124. See id. at66,711-12.
125. See id. at 66,712.
126. Wilkins & Stroman, supra note 60.
127. See Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 113, at 66,711-12 (Dec. 22,1995). The nine conditions are: (1)
discovery through an environmental audit or objective, documented, systematic procedure reflecting due diligence in
preventing, detecting and correcting violations; (2) the violation was discovered voluntarily, not through a required
reporting mechanism such as by permit or administrative order; (3) full disclosure in writing within ten days of
discovery; (4) identification and disclosure prior to any agency action or inspection and prior to its imminent discovery
by a regulatory agency; (5) correction of the noncompliance and remediation within sixty days of discovery; (6)
agreement in writing to prevent recurrence of the violation; (7) the violation cannot be a repeat of a same or similar
violation that has occurred within the past three years or part of a pattern of violations within the past five years; (8)
the violation did not result in serious harm or present an imminent and substantial danger to human health or
environment; and (9) the entity will cooperate as instructed by EPA by providing access to all documents and employees
and assisting in EPA's investigation. See Id.
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principally because of the risk of weakening state enforcement programs, the
imposition of unnecessary transaction costs and delays in enforcement actions and
the potential increase in the number of situations requiring the expenditure of
scarce agency resources, including the 'overfiling' of state enforcement actions."'
The EPA believes that "[e]nvironmental audit privilege laws promote secrecy,
interfere with law enforcement, impede public right-to-know, and can penalize
employees who report illegal activity to law enforcement authorities. They interfere
with government's ability to obtain the information it needs to protect human health
and the environment.' '129 The EPA "has expressed legal and policy reservations about
many of these state laws because of its view that they may jeopardize these states'
authority to enforce federal law and regulations."13 Although the EPA has been
developing results-oriented measures that do not focus on enforcement, it indicates
that these measures cannot replace enforcement tools.' The EPA continues to stress
that enforcement actions are necessary because of the deterrent effect of those
actions.'32 The EPA also indicates that it expects states to use enforcement actions
as a barometer of enforcement success because the EPAs own performance is
evaluated by measures that count inspections and enforcement actions. 33
In addition, the EPA stressed that the policy is guidance only, and "does not
create any rights, duties, obligations, or defenses, implied or otherwise, in any third
parties."" The EPA Audit Policy has been highly criticized because it is a non-
binding policy, and grants no certainty that enforcement actions will not be taken in
response to self-audits. 35 If the EPA does not follow its policy, a company does not
have any legal protection to rely on.136
The issuance of the EPA's audit policy did little to discourage states from
enacting audit laws. However, the EPA responded to the enactment of audit laws
with threats to either overfile or revoke states' delegation under the CAA, CWA, and
RCRA. 3 7 For example, in 1996 Colorado received one overfile action, while in 1997
it received three overfile actions with the threat of ten more.13 8  The total fines
imposed by Colorado in these three instances was $593,000, while the total fines
imposed by the EPA was $2,332,771, an increase of 293 %. 39 In each of these three
128. EPA Convenes 'Summit' on 'E' Audits as Industry, States Ponder 'Privilege,' supra note 110.
129. Herman Statement, supra note 111.
130. ENViRONiENTAL PROTE ION: EPA's AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 25, n.4. Specifically, the EPA
is concerned about potential limits to states' abilities to either obtainpenalties orinjunctivereliefor acquire information
necessary to determine whether an entity has complied with program requirements. See Id.
131. See id. at47.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 48.
134. Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 113, at 66,712.
135. See id.
136. See George Van Cleve & Keith W. Holman, Promise and Reality in the Enforcement ofthe Amended Clean
AirActPart1II: Federal Enforceability and EnvironmentalAuditing, 27 ENVTL L. REP. 10151,10158 (Apr. 1997).
137. See Bangert Statement III, supra note 48.
138. See id.
139. See id. See also Radiator Company Agrees to Pay $180,000 to Settle RCRA Violation Charges with EPA,
BNANAT'LENV'TDALY, Feb. 6,1998, at d3, where one ofthe overfiled companies (Denver Radiator) agreed to settle
for $180,000. This is $286,000 less than the original $466,000 imposed by the EPA, but $65,000 more than the
1999]
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cases, the company corrected its violations; and the state indicated that there was "no
continuing harm to the public or the environment."14 As a result of fears that the
EPA will use audit results to file some form of federal action, no self-audits have
been performed in Colorado in over a year. 4 '
Texas changed its audit laws in response to the EPA's threat to deny final
delegation approval to the Texas CAA Title V program. 42 Idaho allowed its
environmental audit law to sunset because of threats of revocation of its CAA Title
V program. 43 Michigan, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming have made changes in their
laws in order to satisfy the EPA,1  and proposed audit legislation bills failed to pass
in Delaware, Louisiana and West Virginia after EPA representatives testified against
such legislation in those states. 45 Further, the EPA's legal and policy concerns kept
it from issuing final approval to some states' environmental programs. In some
instances, the EPA granted interim approval only. 4 6 The EPA regions were asked
to investigate the "unacceptable drop in the number of enforcement actions" by states
in those regions. 47
VII. THE EPA's OPTIONS
If the EPA is dissatisfied with a state's enforcement efforts, it has two options:
revocation of a state's permitting program or overfiling a state enforcement action.
Both options are problematic; they are extreme and do not offer a practical, reliable
solution that can be applied consistently. Revocation effectively takes away all state
enforcement authority, bringing complete enforcement authority back to the EPA. 148
Revocation is impractical because it requires the EPA to reallocate resources to
enforcement that a state had been handling, straining already limited resources. In
addition, the EPA is likely dissatisfied with only one portion of a state's enforcement,
and revoking complete enforcement authority may not be either necessary or
desirable. The EPA appropriately likens this situation to "using a pretty big hammer
to kill a pretty small gnat."' 49 The use of revocation is a macro-level decision that
forces the EPA into an all or nothing situation. It appears that the EPA will avoid
$115,000 proposed by the state.
140. Bangert Statement I, supra note 48.
141. See Al Knight, Reining in EPA's Goon Squads, DENVER POST, May 10, 1998, at G03.
142. See Van Cleve & Holman, supra note 136, at 10,162 (citing Clean Air Final Interim Approval of Operating
Permits Program; the State of Texas, 61 Fed. Reg. 32693 (1996)).
143. See Mark Anderson & Alisa Shiratori, EPA, States Clash on Environmental Policies, Environment News
(visited Aug. 10, 1998) <www.heartland.orglenvironment/August clash.htm>.
144. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECMON: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 49.
145. See Anderson'& Shiratori, supra note 143.
146. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 7.
147. Id. States thathavebeen delegated authority programs under the RCRA, CWA, and CAA are required to report
on inspections they havemade. They must provide theEPA with the number and type of inspections, inspections results,
and any enforcement actions that occur as a result of violations found during the inspections. See Id. at 16.
148. See RCRA § 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1994); CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
149. Amy Porter, Hazardous Waste: Court Rules EPA Has No RCRA Authority to 'Overfile' State Enforcement
Actions, 29 ENV'T REP. 917 (Sept. 4, 1998).
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this choice if at all possible, mainly for practical considerations, because it is not
reasonable to revoke the entire program given the EPA' s strained resources unless the
EPA is totally dissatisfied with a state's entire program. So far, although the EPA
has threatened to revoke states' permitting programs, it has only used the threat of
revocation to force states to change their laws prior to enactment in order to conform
with the EPA's wishes.15
The EPA's second option in response to audit laws is to overfile.' 5' Overfiling
is also extreme, albeit on a micro-level basis because it focuses on one individual
entity rather than a state's entire enforcement program. The courts have recognized
that federal and state governments can take enforcement actions "concurrently or
subsequent to one another.""15 By overfiling, the EPA can circumvent the state audit
laws that protect audit reports by bringing the action under federal law.'53
The EPA has indicated that overfiling takes place where "the state response to
a violator or environmental condition fails to protect human health or the environ-
ment, fails to deter future violations by a major repeat violator, or fails to protect law-
abiding facilities from competitive disadvantage." '54 The EPA will also overfile if
"the state doesn't get a sufficient penalty or in some other way doesn't meet our
needs."' 55 The EPA indicates that overfiling should occur when a state "fails to take
timely and appropriate action" or "where the state's action is clearly inadequate. 156
The EPA states that generally, overfiling actions should not take place where a state
takes timely and appropriate action, but that the decision to overfile is a "policy
matter, not a requirement of statutory or case law.' '1
5 7
The EPA actually overfiles in very few instances. In 1992 and 1993, the EPA
overfiled on approximately thirty cases. 158  From 1994 through 1996, the EPA took
twenty-two overfiling actions. 59 However, although the total number of instances in
which overfiling takes place is fairly minimal, the impact on an overfiled entity can
150. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
151. An overfiling action takes place "[w]hen the EPA exercises its authority to prosecute an alleged violator in an
approved state that has already initiated its own enforcement action for the same requirements against the same
defendant." William Daniel Benton,Application ofResJudicata and Collateral Estoppel to EPA Overfiling, 16 B.C.
ENvTL. AFF. REV. 199, 203-04 (vinter 1988).
152. Katherine C. Kellner, Comment, Separate But Equal: Double Jeopardy and Environmental Enforcement
Actlons,28 ENVT. L. 169,174 (Spring 1998) (referencing United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996,1000-03
(9th Cir. 1980), in which the court noted that "[s]ection 13241) [of the CWA] reserves EPA's authority to bring an
enforcement action notwithstanding an approved state permit system with concomitant enforcement powers.
Enforcement actions could have been filed concurrently in both state and federal courts.").
153. See Wilkins & Stroman, supra note 60.
154. Herman Statement I, supra note I 11.
155. Tripp Baltz, EPA Overfiles State in RCRA Cases, Third Time in Colorado in Last Two Months, BNA STATE
ENV'T DAILy, Mar. 21, 1997 at d5.
156. EPA, Guidance on RCRA Overfiling (visited Aug. 10, 1998) <htip://envinfo.com/caain/
enforcement/caadl20.html>.
157. Id.
158. See Oversight Hearing on the Relationship Between the Fed. and State Gov'ts in the Enforcement of
Environmental Laws Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement
of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA)
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be quite severe.160
Envirocare, a Utah company, agreed to settle with the EPA for $197,000 in
exchange for the EPA's agreement to drop its overfiling charge. 16' The state of Utah
originally assessed a $60,000 fine, settling with Envirocare for $30,000.162 The state
increased its penalty to $79,000 because of the EPA's dissatisfaction with the original
assessment; however, the EPA did not consider the $79,000 to be a sufficient
deterrent and overfiled with a penalty of $601,503.163
In West Virginia, a state agency imposed a $2,000 penalty on the Beaumont
Company, while the EPA overfiled and sought $1.3 million. 6 Beaumont argued that
the EPA was precluded from taking action where action had been taken by the state
in an RCRA case.165 The Director of the West Virginia Division of Natural
Resources called the EPA's action a "breach of trust,"'166 and indicated that the "fines
are nowhere nearly commensurate with the environmental harm or with the nature of
the violations."' 67
Congressional opinion of overfiling has been extremely negative:
[Tlhe Agency is expected to eliminate dual jurisdiction problems wherever
possible and is directed to curtail the practice of overfiling on actions that have
been previously filed by the States. In this regard, the Agency is asked to report
by June 30, 1996 on the progress it has made in the reduction of dual jurisdictional
problems as well as on the number and reasons for any overfilings it has
undertaken during fiscal year 1996.168
The duplicative nature of an overfiling action penalty is disturbing not only
because it increases a penalty imposed on an entity, but because it does so without
any additional work.169 The EPA can obtain the necessary documentation of an
entity's violations from a state entity's files, "then draft a complaint based on the
state's work and file it in the local federal district court."17 This method of imposing
a penalty is less expensive and less cumbersome than initially obtaining information
160. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
161. See Envirocare Gets $197,000 Fine, DEFENSE CLEANUP, Oct. 31, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12946153.
162. See Brent Israelsen, EPA Deems Utah Fine Too Low, Nails Envirocare for $600,000; Envirocare Faces
$600,000 Fine from EPA, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Aug. 1, 1997, at Al.
163. See Business & Technology: ParsonsRecommends Rod Changes That Save EPA $38MMat Lowty Landfill,
HAzARDOUS WASrm NEws, September 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10931522. See also Tripp Baltz, EPA
Overflies Utah in Waste Facility Case, Says State Fine TooLowto Deter Violations, BNASTATEENv'TDAILY, Aug.
1, 1997 at d2.
164. See EAB Told verfi ing OKOnly When State Completely Fails toAct, PEMSCIDE &ToXIc CHmicALNEws,
Apr. 12, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8217735.
165. See id. See also supra note 15 and accompanying textregarding differences between thel anguage in the RCRA
versus language in the CAA and CWA.
166. EPA ActionsAgainst Companies Trouble State RegulatoryAgency, STATFJoURNAL(Charleston W. Va.), Apr.
1, 1992, at V8, n4, § 1.
167. See id.
168. H.R. Rep. No. 104-201 at51 (1995).
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to evaluate a second entity's compliance with environmental regulations.' 7 ' Although
this process
may conserve EPA's enforcement resources, it is actually a duplication of effort
and wastes limited enforcement dollars. EPA's efforts do not produce additional
facts or other pertinent information necessary to bring additional actions against
other pollution sources. Instead, EPA recycles the same data and creates the
illusion that it is leading the way in cracking down on the nation's polluters. As
a result, while federal and state agencies are pursuing one violator, other known
or suspected violators are left outside the enforcement umbrella due to lack of
money and insufficient personnel to pursue additional cases. Any money that is
collected will end up in the general fund and will not create any additional funds
for enforcement purposes. Consequently, the goal of fair and equitable treatment
of the regulated community is not achieved as violators are either receiving a
double blow or escaping untouched. 72
Overfiling impedes expedient resolution.'73 An entity assessed with violations
may be required to negotiate with the EPA in addition to a state agency. 74 The
environment does not receive additional benefit from a second set of negotiations
because the entity that violated the regulations will have initiated compliance
procedures required by any settlement agreement made with the state agency. 7'
Overfiling may also prevent or delay settlement with a state on the basis that the EPA
can always impose a second penalty in spite of enforcement action taken by a state
agency. 17
6
The EPA's overfiling authority has been likened to extortion and is said to have
been used as a "weapon" to force changes in state laws.77 The EPA clearly envisions
overfiling in response to audit privilege and immunity laws according to its Audit
Policy, which states that it "reserves its right to take necessary actions to protect
public health or the environment by enforcing against any violations of federal
law."'17 The suggestion was made that the EPA should be required to establish clear
criteria under which conditions it will overfile 79 so that entities will not see it as a
tool that the EPA uses when states' fines and penalties are not viewed as "high
enough."'80 Establishing overfiling criteria would also prevent the practice from
being viewed as a purely political tool that questions the judgment of state regulatory
agencies.
171. See id.
172. Id. at 1094-95.
173. See id. at 1095.
174. See id.
175. See Cook, supra note 13, at 1095.
176. See id. at 1096.
177. Bangert Statement I, supra note 39.
178. Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 113, at 66,712.
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VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND COMMON LAW
DOCTRINES
The impasse resulting from the opposing positions of the states and the EPA
leads many to believe that federal legislative intervention is necessary in order to
establish an even playing field for all the parties involved.181 The 105th Congress
submitted three bills that would have granted limited privileges and immunities to
entities performing voluntary environmental self-audits.18 In spite of apparently
strong support, however, none of the three passed as law. The Eighth Circuit recently
upheld a controversial district court decision in Hannon Industries, Inc. v.
Browner,'83 which may revive Congressional interest in state self-audit laws.
In the absence of federal legislation, companies may have to rely on the
traditional common law doctrines of collateral estoppel"8 and res judicata'85 to avoid
a second enforcement action by the EPA. Application of these doctrines is "central
to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution
of disputes within their jurisdictions. "[The doctrines] protect[] [parties] from the
expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserve[] judicial resources, and
foster[] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions. ' '18 6
The plain language of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, Clean Water
Act, and the Clean Air Act does not preclude application of either res judicata or
collateral estoppel.187 The statutes do not explicitly authorize overfiling,' 88 so the
statutes do not contain language to prevent preclusion resulting from the application
of the common law doctrines.'89 However, to apply either of the doctrines, a "finding
181. See Norton Statement, supra note 25.
182. See S.866, 105th Cong. (1997); S.1332, 105th Cong. (1997) and H.R. 1884, 105th Cong. (1997).
183. Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, No.98-3775,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22405, at *1 (8th Cir. Sept. 16, 1999),
affig 19 F. Supp. 2d 988 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
184. "Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from
the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by
preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). "Under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel ... the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes
relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action." Id. at n
185. Theresjudicatarulerequires that "a finaljudgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies
based on the same cause of action." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). "Under the doctrine ofres
judicata, ajudgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on
the same cause of action." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
186. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153.
187. See RCRA § 3008,42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1994) (authorizing EPA enforcement action); CAA § 113,42 U.S.C.
§ 7413 (1994) (authorizing EPA enforcement action); and CWA § 309,33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994) (authorizing EPA
enforcement action).
188. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
189. See RCRA § 3008,42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1994) (authorizing EPA enforcement action); CAA § 113,42 U.S.C.
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that governments were in privity with one another"'9 would have to be made where
"state and federal governments have concurrent enforcement authority."''" The EPA
would not be a party to a state proceeding, so in order for res judicata or collateral
estoppel to apply, privity with the state party would have to be found.192
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "once an issue is actually and
necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is
conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party
to the prior litigation."' 93 Under collateral estoppel, a party cannot relitigate an issue
in a later action when "the issue was actually and necessarily determined by a final
judgment in a prior action.' '194  The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to
administrative determinations and nonlitigatedjudicial consent decrees.'" Collateral
estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised for the doctrine to apply.'96
The res judicata rule requires that "a final judgment on the merits bars further
claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action."' 97 Res judicata
prevents a subsequent suit "involving the same parties or their privies based on the
same cause of action."' 93 Res judicata has been raised in the context of an overfile
case, but has been classified as an affirmative defense.' 99 Therefore, if it is not
specifically pleaded, it is waived.2"
"The existence of concurrent enforcement powers does not per se negate the
application of res judicata principles."20' The court in U.S. v. I7T Rayonier, Inc. 20 2
noted that under the CWA, both a state agency and the EPA could bring enforcement
actions against an entity.2 3 However, the court stated that "[t]his does not
necessarily preclude the operation of collateral estoppel after one action reaches
finality."204 Based on the court's evaluation of the CWA's statutory language, it
determined that the CWA did not "manifest countervailing policy reasons to abrogate
the doctrine known generically as res judicata."2 5  The court found that the
190. Benton, supra note 151, at 201.
191. Id.
192. See generally id. at 247-61. The article describes three categories in which there is potential for privity to be
established between a state and the EPA. The first, or traditional, privity category takes place where "preclusion is
extended to persons who were represented by parties with the authority to do so." Id. at 250. In the second category,
"preclusion is extended to nonparties whose participation is so extensive that they are de facto parties.' Id. In the third
category, "the party to the first suit shared such an identity of interests with the subsequently precluded party so as to
be its 'virtual representative.' Id.
193. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
194. DavidT. BuenteJr. et al., The 'Civil'Implications ofEnvironmental Crimes, 23 ENvT.L. REP. 10589 (Oct.
1993).
195. See id.
196. See Benton, supra note 151, at 253.
197. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153.
198. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,326 n.5 (1979).
199. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470,485 n.7 (D.S.C. 1995).
See also Benton, supra note 151, at 253.
200. See Friends of the Earth, 890 F.Supp. at485 n.7 (commenting on the applicability ofresjudicata as a result
of supplemental briefs requested of the parties; res judicata was otherwise not raised).
201. U.S. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1980).
202. Id. at 996.
203. See id. at 1001.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1002.
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relationship between the state agency and the EPA was sufficiently close to determine
that the EPA was collaterally estopped from relitigating the same enforcement issue
that had been decided in state court, and the action was dismissed.2" 6
Treatment under I7TRayonier should be applicable to actions under the CAA
and RCRA as well as the CWA, even though some of the language in each of the
statutes is different.2 All three statutes reserve EPA enforcement authority while
establishing a federal/state partnership.20 8 The permits under all three of the statutes
"are derived from a single act of Congress, even if they are issued by a state."209 In
fact, treatment based on T Rayonier was recently used in Harmon I, where the
court struck down the EPA's authority to overfile.210 In Harmon I, the court
determined that the EPA was prevented from overfiling based on both the plain
language of RCRA and the principle of res judicata.2"
In 1987, the management of Harmon Industries, Inc. (Harmon), discovered that
its employees were disposing of organic solvent, a hazardous waste, by emptying
pails of the solvent on the ground behind Harmon's plant.212 Harmon subsequently
contacted the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) and informed the
MDNR of its violations.213 The MDNR conducted an investigation and Harmon
initiated cleanup procedures. 214 Harmon began to usenonhazardous cleaning material
in place of the organic solvent and hired consultants to investigate the site.215
The MDNR, the agency authorized to administer RCRA in Missouri, monitored
Harmon's progress in its cleanup efforts.216 Harmon provided the MDNR with
reports prepared by Harmon's consultant, while the MDNR periodically conducted
further investigations.2 7 Harmon and MDNR entered into a Consent Decree in 1993
that provided that "'Harmon's compliance with this Consent Decree constitutes full
satisfaction and release from all claims arising from allegations contained in
[MDNR's] petition.' 218 The Consent Decree stated that the terms of the Decree were
applicable to anyone "acting in concert and in privity with" Harmon. 2 9 Because of
Harmon's cooperation and initiative in correcting its violations, the MDNR never
206. Seeid. at998, 1003.
207. See Benton, supra note 151, at 255. The EPA itself has, in internal documents, noted the difference between
the language of the statutes and formulated an argument that when EPA intervening action is precluded under the
RCRA, it should not be under the CWA or the CAA based on the differences in the language. EPA, Guidance on
RCRA Overfiling (visited Aug. 10, 1998) <http://envinfo.corn/caain/enforcement/caadl20.htmlb.
208. See Benton, supra note 151, at 255.
209. Id.
210. See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 19 F. Supp. 2d 988 (W.D. Mo. 1998), affd. No. 98-3775,1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22405, at *1 (8th Cir. Sept. 16, 1999).
211. See id.
212. See id. at 989.
213. See id.
214. See iL
215. See id. at 990.
216. See Harmon, 19 F. Supp. 2d 988 at 990-91 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
217. See id.
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imposed a monetary penalty upon Harmon.22 In responding to the hazardous waste
disposal violations, Harmon spent in excess of $2.5 million apart from any potential
penalty impact.22'
During the period the MDNR was investigating Harmon, copies of some of
Harmon's reports were sent to the EPA.222 Correspondence from the EPA to the
MDNR indicated the EPA's view that "formal enforcement action seeking monetary
penalties" should be sought by the MDNR.223 In 1991, the EPA filed an administra-
tive complaint against Harmon, proposing a penalty of $2,343,706.224 In a
proceeding before an administrative law judge (ALJ), the penalty was reduced to
$586,716 in accordance with RCRA's Civil Penalty Policy and Civil Enforcement
Policy.'
Harmon appealed the decision of the ALJ to the EPA' s Environmental Appeals
Board (EAB).226 On appeal, Harmon raised several issues, including "whether
[EPA's] enforcement action against Harmon is precluded by the language of RCRA
and by principles of res judicata"227 and whether the gravity portion of the penalty
should be eliminated in accordance with the EPA's self-policing policy because
"Harmon discovered and voluntarily reported its own violations and worked
cooperatively.., to remedy the violations. 228
The EAB disposed of Harmon's statutory language argument quickly, stating
that "it is well settled that, even when the authorized State has taken action, RCRA
nevertheless authorizes the [EPA] to take its own action."2 9 This "well settled"'
reading of the RCRA appears to be established mainly on the EPA's own decisions
and one district court case that may be distinguishable on its facts."' The EAB
decided not to delve further into Harmon's statutory language argument because
"Harmon has not offered any persuasive reasons to reopen this well-established
reading. ' ' 22
The EAB also rejected Harmon's argument that the EPA was precluded from
bringing an enforcement action against Harmon based on the res judicata doctrine. 1 3
220. See id. See also Porter, supra note 149; Harmon Electronics, Inc., No. VII-91-H-0037, RCRA (3008) Appeal
No. 94-4, 1997 WL 133778, at *4 (EPA Envtl. Appeals Board March 24, 1997).
221. No Penalty for Self-Reported Violations, Hannon Argues, PEsTic mE &TOxaCCH H vCALNEws, February
22, 1995, available in 1995 VL 8217440.
222. See Harmon, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (W.D. Mo. 1998).




227. Harmon Electronics, Inc., No. VII-91-H-0037, RCRA (3008) Appeal No. 94-4,1997 WL 133778, at*2 (EPA




231. See id. at*n.7. In thedistrictcourt'sdecisioninEPAv. Environmental WasteControl, Inc-,710 F. Supp. 1172,
1186 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990), the court found that the state of Indiana was not actually
authorized to enforce the provisions of certain amendments to RCRA, indicating that the state action may have been
inappropriate. Although the case was appealed and affirmed, this particular issue was not included in the appeal.
232. Id. at *7.
233. SeeHarmonElectronicsInc.,No.VII-91-H-0037, RCRA(3008)AppeaNo.94-4,1997 WL 133778, at*7-11
(EPA Envtl. Appeals Board March 24, 1997).
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The EAB determined that in this case, the EPA was not in privity with the state of
Missouri because there was no "identity of interests"34 between the two parties. 5
The EAB's privity evaluation hinged on the fact that the EPA wanted to impose a
penalty while the state of Missouri did not:
[B]efore the entry of the consent decree, the [EPA] unequivocally expressed its
interest in having substantial penalties assessed against Harmon (later proposing
a penalty in excess of $2.3 million). [Missouri], on the other hand, expressed its
interest in rewarding Harmon for what [Missouri] viewed as Hannon's self-
reporting of the violations charged in this action by settling the matter without
penalties. Given this clash of interests over the propriety and amount of penalties,
we conclude that no identity of interests existed between [EPA] and the State of
Missouri with respect to the entry of the consent decree. In other words, the
particular circumstances of this case do not establish a relationship of privity
between [EPA] and [Missouri]. 6
The EAB also dismissed Harmon's argument that the gravity penalty should be
reduced in accordance with theEPA's self-policing policy. 7 The EPA had classified
Harmon's audit as a "safety walk-through" rather than an audit, indicating that the
provisions of its audit policy were not applicable;238 however, it has been recognized
that the Harmon case is the first in which the applicability of the EPA's audit policy
has been invoked. 9 Harmon's request that the penalty be reduced because it had
complied in "'spirit' and 'essence""'24 was rejected by the EAB, which stated that
part of the policy would be "undermined if the penalty reduction provisions.., were
applied in full here."241 The EAB noted that Harmon had not complied with all nine
of the conditions required by the EPA's Audit Policy in order to reduce or eliminate
a penalty, and also pointed out that "the policy is specifically intended as guidance
in a settlement context and was never meant for use in an adjudicatory context."2 42
The EAB also determined that once enforcement cases are being adjudicated,
penalties cannot be mitigated even if the violations were self-reported.243
Harmon appealed the EAB's decision to the Western District Court of
Missouri.244 The court reversed the EAB decision on the basis of both the statutory
234. Id. at *10.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at *26-28.
238. AuditPolicyDoesNotApply toHarmnon Overfiling Case, EPA ArguesPEncDE&ToxicCHEAflCALNEwS,
April 12, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8217734.
239. See Amy Porter, Harmon Electronics Ruling on Overfiling, Audit Policy Has Implications for Other Laws,
BNA NAT'L ENV'T DLY, Mar. 26, 1997, at d4.
240. HarmonElectronics, Inc.,No.VII-91-H-0037,RCRA (3008) AppealNo. 94-4,1997 WL 133778, at *27 (EPA
Envtl. Appeals Board March 24, 1997).
241. Id. at *28.
242. Id. at *27.
243. See Waste Regulation: Appeals Board Backs EPA's Authority on Some State Enforcement Cases, SoLID
W, ST REPORT, April 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10909429.
244. Harmon, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
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language and res judicata arguments, treating the EPA's actions quite harshly.245
In its discussion of the statutory language argument, the court noted that "[t]his
issue in the context of RCRA appears to be one of first impression."2" The court
held that the plain language of RCRA "provides that the MDNR operates 'in lieu of
or instead of the federal program. ,247 The court stated that the "concept of co-
existing enforcement powers... would predictably result in confusion, inefficiency,
duplicative agency expenditures and would thwart the public policy of early and non-
judicial dispute resolution. 2 48
The court indicated that under the statutory language and legislative history of
RCRA, the EPA can take enforcement action in an authorized state only when a state
fails to take any action and the EPA gives notice that it will take action.249 If the EPA
is dissatisfied with the manner in which a state is handling enforcement, its only other
option is to withdraw authorization approval from the state." The EPA does not
have "the option to reject part of a program or course of action on an incident-by-
incident basis because the EPA believes the penalty to be inadequate .... [S]uch a
schizophrenic approach to enforcement of RCRA would result in uncertainty in the
public mind." 1 The court took issue with the EPA's decision to impose a penalty:
The Court finds it interesting that the EPA only focused on seeking a penalty in
this case. The EPA does not take issue with MDNR's investigation, cleanup, or
enforcement of RCRA, but only takes issue with MDNR's choice not to pursue
a penalty. Therefore, the Court finds the objectives of RCRA were met through
the actions of the MDNR and finds it somewhat disconcerting that the only
argument regarding MDNR's effectiveness is money. 2
The court also found for Harmon on its res judicata argument. 3 The decision
hinged upon the establishment of privity between the EPA and the MDNR2 4 Under
Missouri law, "[p]rivity connotes those who are in law so connected with a party to
the judgment as to have such an identity of interest that the party to the judgment
represented the same legal right; and where this identity of interest is found to exist,
all are alike concluded and bound by the judgment." 5 The EPA argued that it did
not have an identity of interest with Missouri, so it was not in privity to the Consent
Decree. 6 Harmon argued that the state authorization under RCRA itself established
245. See id.
246. Id at 995.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 994-96.
250. See Harmon, 19 F. Supp. 2d 988,994-96.
251. Id. at 996.
252. Id at 996, n.8 (emphasis added).
253. See id. at 997-98.
254. See id. at 997.
255. Id.
256. See Harmon, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
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privity.257 In Missouri, parties have been found in privity where the "same legal
rights were asserted'' 8 even though the parties' interests "may not have been
identical."' 9 The court found that "MDNR was authorized as a state agency and the
underlying interests are nearly identical., 261 It held that the EPA was prevented from
imposing penalty violations because res judicata was applicable.26'
On September 16, 1999, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's decision,
affirming both the interpretation of the statutory language and the res judicata
arguments.262 In its brief opinion, the court noted that "[t]he permissibility of
overfdling ... is a question of first impression in the federal circuit courts., 263
The court first analyzed the statutory language of the RCRA, reviewing de novo
the district court's "findings and conclusions regarding the correctness of an agency's
statutory interpretations." 264 The EPA argued that the RCRA phrase "in lieu of"
referred to the regulations to be enforced and not to the enforcing party; however, the
Eighth Circuit found that "[a]n examination of the statute as a whole supports the
district court's interpretation., 26' The court determined that "[t]he plain 'in lieu of
language contained in the RCRA reveals a congressional intent for an authorized state
program to supplant the federal hazardous waste program in all respects including
enforcement. '266 The RCRA language indicates that the states themselves, rather
than the EPA, should have the "primary role" of RCRA enforcement. 267 Where the
state has been authorized to enforce RCRA, the EPA is limited to a secondary role
in which it may take enforcement action in two instances: (1) when the EPA has
rescinded the state's authority, or (2) when the state has taken no action
whatsoever . 8 The court noted that the RCRA's legislative history demonstrated
congressional intent that the states should have primary enforcement authority,
further supporting the district court's statutory interpretation.269
The court also rejected the EPA's contention that the "same force and effect"
language of the RCRA is limited to the issuance of state permits and is not applicable
to enforcement action.27 The court noted that "[n]othing in the statute suggests that
the 'same force and effect' language is limited to the issuance of permits but not their
enforcement." 27' The court found that "the meaning of the text is plain and obvious"
and refused to apply the EPA's interpretation in the absence of "clear and unambigu-
257. See id.




262. Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, No. 98-3775, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22405, at *1 (8th Cir. Sept. 16,1999).
263. Id. at *6.
264. Id. at *4.
265. Id. at *9.
266. Id. at *9-10.
267. Id. at*10.
268. See Harmon, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22405, at *11.
269. Id. at *16-17.
270. See id. at *12.
271. Id. at *13.
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ous" instruction from Congress due to the "peculiar result" it would have.272
In summary, the court found that based on the plain language of the RCRA and
its legislative history, the EPA cannot bring a second enforcement action when a state
has already initiated one of its own.273  If the EPA feels that the state's action is
inadequate, it must notify the state and give the state an opportunity to "correct the
deficiency" and then withdraw the state's RCRA authorization.274 Otherwise, there
could be two separate enforcement actions, which "would derogate theRCRA's plain
language and legislative history." '275 The court noted that "[s]uch a potential schism
runs afoul of the principles of comity and federalism so clearly embedded in the text
and history of the RCRA."276 The court stated that "[t]he EPA's interpretation
simply is not consistent with the plain language of the statute, its legislative history,
or its declared purpose. Hence, it is also an unreasonable interpretation to which we
accord no deference. 277 Based on this interpretation, the court found that the EPA
had exceeded its authority by initiating an overfiling action.278
The court also upheld Harmon's res judicata argument, finding privity between
the EPA and the state of Missouri because their relationship in the enforcement was
nearly identical.279 The court reviewed the RCRA's statutory language and found
that "Missouri's action has the same force and effect as an action initiated by the
EPA. Accordingly, the two parties stand in the same relationship to one another.
280
Although the EPA argued that it had different enforcement interests than the state of
Missouri, the court noted that privity does not depend on the "subjective interests" of
the parties, but rather on the representation of the "same legal right. 28' Therefore,
the EPA and the state of Missouri were in privity and res judicata prevented the
EPA's enforcement action. 2
The EPA raised a sovereign immunity defense on appeal, claiming that the
doctrine prevented the application of res judicata in this case because the United
States was not the named party in the prior lawsuit.283 The court noted, however, that
under the RCRA, the "federal government authorizes the state to act in its place. It
cedes its authority to the state pursuant to the authorization plan contained in the
statute., 284  Once the EPA authorizes a state to enforce the RCRA, "the state
'prosecutes' enforcement actions 'in lieu of the federal government and operates as
if it were the EPA. ' 285 Therefore, the court held that the sovereign immunity defense
272. Id. at *12-13.
273. See id. at *18.
274. See Harmon, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22405, at *18-19.
275. Id. at *19.
276. Id. at *20.
277. Id.
278. See id. at *20-21.
279. See id. at *23.
280. Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, No. 98-3775,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22405, at*23 (8thCir. Sept. 16,1999).
281. Id. at *24.
282. See id. at 27.
283. See id. at 24.
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was not applicable and res judicata barred the EPA from bringing an enforcement
action against Harmon. 86
The Harmon I district court decision was called a "stunning blow to EPA's
enforcement program. '  Industry attorneys have indicated that the decision should
have a positive impact because companies will be able to negotiate settlements with
state agencies without concern that the EPA will step in later.2 8' The questioh now
is how the Eighth Circuit decision will impact enforcement activity in other circuits
and as to other statutes, such as the CWA and CAA. The language of the other
statutes is different, so it is uncertain whether Harmon II will apply,289 and it is also
uncertain whether the EPA will pursue additional action in Harmon II or whether it
will look to pursue a case in another circuit in order to create a conflict.29 Given the
outcome of Harmon II and the EPA's desire to maintain the option to overfile, the
prominence of debate on the overfiling practice has increased, and it is certain that
additional activity will result.
IX. CONCLUSION
The public has become much more aware of environmental issues and their
consequences since the first federal environmental statutes were enacted. Heightened
public awareness demands solutions that do not rely on strictly delineated roles
between the federal and state governments, but instead concentrate on the most
important issue: resolving environmental problems so that individual and public
health and safety concerns are reduced. The focus needs to be on improving the
environment and the best way for obtaining that goal.
The EPA wants a consistent approach which continues to emphasize deterrence,
while the states want flexibility in achieving environmental compliance and
improvements. Both are valid arguments, but the EPA and the states have
fundamental ideological differences that must be addressed in order to create an
adequate solution.
The EPA's continued focus on deterrence might deter the wrong parties. The
EPA stated that it originally imposed a $2.3 million fine on Harmon as a deterrent.
The fine was obviously not a deterrent to Harmon, who stopped the violative practice
immediately upon discovery. In addition, Harmon voluntarily reported the violation,
which may never have been discovered by either the EPA or the state agency. If the
fine was assessed to deter others, the deterrence motivation may backfire by deterring
entities from reporting violations rather than deterring entities from committing
violations. Companies may prefer engaging in an inspection roulette game rather
286. See Harmon, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22405, at *26-27.
287. Court Strikes Down EPA Authority to 'Overfile' Enforcement Cases, INSIDE E.P.A. WKLY. REP., Aug. 28,
1998.
288. See id.
289. See Susan Carhart, Hazardous Waste:Attorneys Foresee Enforcement Changes Following Rejection of EPA
Overfiling Powers, BNA NAT'L ENV'T DAILY, Sept. 22, 1999. See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
290. See Carhart, supra note 289.
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than voluntarily coming forward with violations if the EPA's reaction is to
immediately impose a heavy fine.
The EPA and the states need to focus on working together where they have
concurrent enforcement authority. Although the EPA has oversight authority, it has
no practical method of invoking that oversight authority when it is dissatisfied with
a state's actions. It is limited to revocation of a state's permitting program or
overfiling. Revocation is completely impractical due to resource concerns, while
overfiling tends to have extremely negative backlash because entities can end up
paying twice for the same violation. Overfiling could be a reasonable solution if
either the EPA or Congress established overfiling requirements and limitations so that
the states and entities subject to EPA regulations would know when the EPA could
overfile, rather than leaving the practice completely discretionary. The entire practice
of overfiling could be eliminated judicially depending on the outcome of Harmon,
which would leave the EPA with little practical oversight authority at all.
The states must demonstrate that their innovative methods are actually working
by improving the environment and are not simply providing a break to entities that
may be committing environmental violations. The states have overcome any
perception that they are soft on polluters due to their immunities and privileges self-
audit laws. The states need to devise measurement criteria so that they can prove
their methods work, and continue to impose penalties where self-audit laws are not
applicable in order to convince both the EPA and the public that their flexible
solutions are working both from a curative standpoint and a deterrant standpoint and
that they will continue to engage in enforcement procedures where necessary.
What motivates compliance? What will encourage entities to discontinue
environmentally harmful practices? Maybe in the past the command and control
method used by the EPA was necessary to enforce compliance with environmental
statutes because neither entities nor the general public was aware of the damage that
resulted. However, public awareness is currently much greater, and other methods
such as limited immunities, privileges, and other incentives may motivate compliance
better than the threat of civil and criminal penalties and injunctions. What remains
to be seen is whether the states will have the opportunity to try out those methods and
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